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Title 17 of the United States Code defines criminal copyright in-
fringement as willful infringement for the purpose of commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain.' Prosecution of criminal copyright
infringement, meaning the piracy2 and counterfeiting5 of all forms of
copyrighted works, is governed by Tide 18 of the United States Code, cov-
ering crimes and criminal procedure.
4
On October 8, 1992, Congress approved the Copyright Felony Act,
5
which harmonizes the sanctions imposed for criminal copyright infringe-
ment. This Article examines the nature of copyright protection, the evolu-
tion of sanctions for criminal infringement, and the elements of the
offense of criminal copyright infringement as defined by the Copyright
Felony Act.
A. Copyright Protection
Copyright, as a form of intellectual property protection, is rooted in
the United States Constitution.6 Copyright subsists in original works of
authorship 7 including the following broad categories: (1) literary works,8
(2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) choreographic works, (5) picto-
* Partner, Arter and Hadden, Washington, D.C.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. "Piracy" or "bootlegging" are words popularly used to describe the unauthorized
duplication of sound recordings, films, tape cartridges, cassettes, software programs on
floppy diskettes, video cassettes, and video games. A pirated copy or bootleg is an accurate
copy of all or part of the original commercial version, but the package and graphics are
usually unrelated in appearance to the original.
3. "Counterfeiting" is one step beyond piracy. A counterfeit reproduces both the un-
derlying work and the packaging, including color art, company labels, corporate logos and
trademarks. A counterfeit is often difficult to distinguish from the original. Indeed, identifi-
cation of counterfeits is often so difficult that unscrupulous retailers and distributors are able
to meld the counterfeits into their stock of legitimate products. See United States v. Shultz,
482 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1973).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. Pub. L No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. § 101. "'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." Id. Thus, computer software programs are pro-
tected as literary works.
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rial, graphic and sculptural works,9 (6) motion pictures' 0 and other audio-
visual works,1 ' and (7) sound recordings.
1 2
The Copyright Act imposes three basic requirements for a work of
authorship to qualify for copyright protection. First, the work must be
original;' 3 it cannot be copied from another source.' 4 Second, the work
must consist of "expression" and not just "ideas."15 Third, the work must
be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression ... from which [it] can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 16 Copyright protection begins as
soon as a work of authorship is created;17 for example, as soon as pen is
put to paper and original sentences appear.
Copyright is a valuable form of intellectual property protection be-
cause, subject to certain limitations, a copyright owner 18 has the exclusive
right to control copying and distribution of his or her work.' 9 Anyone
9. "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural
plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.
Id.
10. "'Motion pictures' are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompany-
ing sounds, if any." Id.
11. "Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
Id.
12. "Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes,
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
Id. Sound recordings were added to the Copyright Act under the Sound Recording Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
13. E.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1978).
16. See i& § 102(a); see also i& § 101 ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expres-
sion when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the au-
thor, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
18. Section 202 of the Copyright Act distinguishes between ownership of a copyright
and ownership of "any material object in which the work is embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 202
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Ownership of the material object, for example, a video tape, does
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object, such as a
sound recording or motion picture.
19. Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that the owner of copyright has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The exclusive rights to perform and display the
copyrighted work publicly are also provided under this section.
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who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is an infringer
of the copyright.
20
Both civil and criminal remedies are available for copyright infringe-
ment. In a civil action an infringer is liable for either the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, 2 1 or
for statutory damages, which range from $500 to $20,000 for each non-
willful infringement and up to $100,000 for each willful infringement.2 2 A
copyright owner who prevails in a civil infringement action is also entitled
to court costs and attorneys' fees. 23 As part of a final judgment or decree,
the court may also order the destruction or forfeiture of all infringing
copies or phonorecords as well as all plates, molds, tapes, film negatives,
and other articles used for reproduction.
24
B. The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement Sanctions
Copyright infringement has been a crime since 1897, when criminal
infringement provisions were first added to U.S. copyright law. 25 The
crime of copyright infringement was initially limited to unlawful perform-
ances and representations of copyrighted dramatic and musical composi-
tions.26 Other acts of copyright infringement, such as unauthorized
reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, were pursued through
civil litigation. Such acts, however, were not considered criminal behavior.
The criminal intent or mens rea requirement for criminal copyright
infringement was also established under the 1897 law. A conviction under
the first criminal infringement provision required a showing that the de-
fendant's conduct was both "willful" and "for profit."
27
The first attempt at broadening the crime of copyright infringement
occurred with the general copyright revision of 1909.28 The 1909 Copy-
right Act applied criminal infringement provisions to all types of copy-
righted works except sound recordings. 29 Again, the mens rea requirement
made infringing conduct criminal only if it was done willfully and for
profit.3 0 The 1909 Copyright Act also imposed criminal liability on any-
20. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988), amended &y 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. III 1991).
21. "In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present
proof only of the infringer's gross revenue[.]" The burden then shifts to the infringer "to
prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. Id. § 504(c)(1) & (2).
23. Id § 505.
24. Id. § 503(b).
25. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 33 stat. 1075-82.
29. Id. § 5. Copyright protection for sound recordings was considered but rejected dur-
ing the 1909 revision to the Copyright Act. Instead, the only copyright protection was given
to the composer of the music, not to the performer or the producer of the recording. Under
compulsory licensing provisions, the composer was given only the exclusive right to license
the first recording of a musical composition. After the composition was first recorded, any-
one else could record the composition so long as a royalty of two cents per copy was paid to
the composer. Id. §§ 1(e), 25(e).
30. Id. § 280.
1994]
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one who "knowingly and willfully" aided and abetted an infringement.3 1
Criminal offenses under the 1909 Copyright Act were punishable as
misdemeanors.
3 2
By 1971, certain inadequacies in the scope of copyright protection
were becoming apparent. For example, the House of Representatives Ju-
diciary Committee estimated the annual volume of record and tape piracy
to be in excess of $100 million.3 3 The Committee traced the record and
tape piracy problem to the exclusion of sound recordings from criminal
copyright infringement provisions. Record pirates had to pay the com-
poser only a de minimis royalty fee to avoid liability under the federal copy-
right statute.
3 4
In response to demands from the sound recording industry, Congress
extended general federal copyright protection to sound recordings with
the Sound Recording Act of 1971.35 This Act makes criminal sanctions
available against willful, for-profit infringement of sound recordings.
3 6
The 1976 general revision to the Copyright Act3 7 continued the of-
fense of criminal copyright infringement, but eliminated the crime of aid-
ing and abetting infringement. The 1976 Copyright Act also altered the
mens rea requirement for criminal copyright infringement. Instead of
proof that the infringement was done willfully and for profit, the offense
of criminal infringement now required conduct engaged in "willfully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private commercial gain."
38
Persons convicted of the misdemeanor offense of criminal infringe-
ment under the 1976 Copyright Act faced a maximum fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than one year or both.3 9 In the case of sound
recordings or motion pictures, the court could increase the fine to
$25,000, although the term of imprisonment remained at one year or
31. Id.
32. Id. Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
is a felony. Any other offense is a misdemeanor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.CAN.
1566, 1567.
34. See Annotation, Making, Selling, or Distributing Counterfeit or "Bootleg" Tape Recordings or
Phonograph Records as Vwlation of Federal Law, 25 A.L.R. FED. 207 n.36 (1975).
35. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
36. See Heilman v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Wis. 1975), afTfd, 583 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
37. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-801).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978). The mens rea requirement does not mandate evidence
that the defendant actually realized commercial advantage or private financial gain, only that
the defendant's activity or activities were for the purpose of financial gain or benefit. See
United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that video store clerk's
assertion that she, as a store employee and not the owner, realized no commercial advantage
or private financial gain from alleged conspiracy, nevertheless did not preclude liability for
criminal infringement).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978).
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less.40 Repeat offenders faced increased fines of not more than $50,000 or
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.
4 1
Upon conviction of criminal copyright infringement, the 1976 Act
also provided for the forfeiture, destruction, or other disposition of all
infringing copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equip-
ment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies or pho-
norecords.4 2 The Act made forfeiture and destruction mandatory for
criminal copyright infringement but discretionary with the court in a civil
infringement action.
43
Beginning in the late 1970s, two trade associations representing the
motion picture and sound recording industries, the Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America, Inc., (MPAA) 44 and the Recording Industry Association
of America, Inc., (RIAA), 45 organized an effort to increase the penalties
for film and record piracy and counterfeiting. In 1979 MPAA and RIAA
reported that even though the motion picture and sound recording indus-
tries were spending upwards of $1 million a year to investigate and combat
piracy through civil infringement actions. The problem of record and
film counterfeiting and piracy remained epidemic.
46
From the point of view of the motion picture and sound recording
industries, civil infringement actions had no deterrent effect on sophisti-
cated criminals engaged in pirating and counterfeiting activities. 47 In ad-
dition, the modest penalties prescribed under then existing law tended to
discourage criminal enforcement efforts.48 U.S. Attorneys confronted
with a wide range of possible prosecutions clearly preferred the prospect
of almost any felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction for copyright
infringement. 49 Most indictments of pirates and counterfeiters focused
40. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, criminal infringement involving sound recordings
would lie for violation of three exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution, and preparation
of derivative works. For motion pictures, criminal infringement would lie for infringement
of reproduction, distribution or public performance rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1978). Crimi-
nal infringement lies in addition to the prohibition on and penalties for trafficking in coun-
terfeit labels for phonorecords, copies of motion pictures, and other audiovisual works. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-19 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (Supp. IV 1992).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(c) (1988), amended &y 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (Supp. IV 1992).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(b).
43. Compare id. ("[tihe court in its judgment of conviction shall, in addition to the pen-
alty") with 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) ("[t]he court may order the destruction").
44. The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., is a trade association representing
producers and distributors of theatrical and television programs exhibited in the United
States and throughout the world. See Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10694-95 (1979) (Joint statement of the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., and Recording Industry Association of America,
Inc.).
45. The Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., "is a trade association of re-
cording companies whose members create and market approximately 90 percent of the
records[, compact discs] and tapes sold in the United States." Id. at 10695.
46. Id. at 10699. MPAA and RIAA estimated that by 1979 "all forms of record and film
counterfeiting and piracy" were draining more than -$650 million annually from legitimate
sales and rentals in both industries." Id. at 10697.
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on related felony offenses such as mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate trans-
portation of stolen property, RICO, and even customs violations, rather
than the principal criminal offenses committed: copyright infringement
and counterfeiting.
5 0
Congress responded to the concerns of the motion picture and sound
recording industries by restructuring the sanctions for criminal infringe-
ment.5 1 The offense of criminal infringement was still defined in § 506(a)
of Title 17; the penalties, however, were placed in new § 2319 of Title
18.52 Certain acts of criminal copyright infringement were also defined as
felony offenses.
5 3
The first felony provisions for criminal copyright infringement involv-
ing reproduction or distribution of records, motion pictures, and audiovi-
sual works laid out substantial sanctions.54 Fines of up to $250,000 and
prison terms of up to five years were available based on a complex formula
of time periods and numbers of infringing copies or phonorecords repro-
duced or distributed.
55
For example, if the defendant was convicted of reproducing or dis-
tributing, during any 180-day period, "at least one thousand phonorecords
or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings," 56 or
50. Id. C.f United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted in pan
469 U.S. 1157, rev'd, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (mail fraud).
51. Act of May 24, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 Star. 91.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982).
53. Id.
54. See id. § 2319. As originally enacted, § 2319 of Title 18 read:
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall be
in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section-
(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both, if the offense-
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of at least one thousand phonorecords or copies
infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings;
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of at least sixty five copies infringing the copyright
in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; or
(C) is a second or subsequent offense under either of subsection (b) (1)
or (b) (2) of this section, where a prior offense involved a sound recording,
or a motion picture or other audiovisual work;
(2) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both, if the offense-
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of more than one hundred but less than one thou-
sand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more
sound recordings; or
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of more than seven but less than sixty five copies
infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovi-
sual works; and
(3) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both, in any other case.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982). Section 2319 refers to both "copies" and "phonorecords."
Both terms were included, "because a motion picture soundtrack that reproduces a sound
recording is a 'copy,' and not a 'phonorecord.' " See 2 PAUL GOLDsrIN, COPYRiGHT: PRiNci-
PLEs, LAW AND PRAcncE § 11.4.1 & n.32 (1989) [hereinafter GousTrEn].
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(A).
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"at least sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more motion
pictures or other audiovisual works,"5 7 or the conviction was a second of-
fense,58 the court could impose a fine of up to $250,000, order the in-
fringer imprisoned for not more than five years, or do both.59 A fine of
no more than $250,000 and imprisonment for no more than two years, or
both, was prescribed for criminal infringement involving "the reproduc-
tion or distribution, during any one-hundred-and-eighty-day period, of
more than one hundred but less than one thousand phonorecords or cop-
ies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings," or "more
than seven but less than sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or
more motion pictures or other audiovisual works."6
Even after these new felony sanctions were enacted, most criminal
copyright infringement remained a misdemeanor offense. For example, if
the infringement case involved motion pictures or sound recordings, but
fewer than the specified number of copies were illegally reproduced, the
offense was a misdemeanor.61 The same result occurred if the govern-
ment failed to prove that all of the infringing copies were made or distrib-
uted within the specified 180-day period. Criminal infringement involving
derivative, performance, or display rights in sound recordings, motion pic-
tures, or other audiovisual works remained misdemeanor offenses. 6 2 It
was also a misdemeanor to duplicate without authorization live perform-
ances not already embodied in existing marketed products.
63
Increased sanctions for certain acts of copyright infringements involv-
ing motion pictures, sound recordings, and audiovisual works were fol-
lowed by increased sanctions for trademark counterfeiting.64 Increased
criminal penalties for trademark counterfeiting were deemed necessary
because civil penalties proved grossly ineffective in deterring these infring-
ing operations. Legitimate businesses were losing billions of dollars each
year to counterfeiters.
65
In the wake of legislation increasing the criminal penalties for trade-
mark counterfeiting and infringements involving motion pictures, sound
recordings, and audiovisual works, the computer software industry became
57. Id. §2319(b)(1)(B).
58. Id. § 2319(b)(1)(C).
59. Id. §2319(b)(1).
60. Id. § 2319(b) (2).
61. See id. § 2319(b) (3); see also United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that evidence showing rental of only six infringing videocassettes is insufficient for
conviction on felony charges requiring proof of unauthorized reproduction of more than
seven infringing copies).
62. C.f United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd by Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 n.6 (1985).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (1982).
64. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178.
65. S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3627,
3631 ("Able to reap huge profits at little expense, and facing neither criminal sanctions nor
substantial civil penalties, counterfeiters have built steadily larger illegal enterprises."); Jed S.
Rakoff & Ira B. Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Praposed Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 20
Am. ClaM. L. REv. 145, 151 (1982) (estimated U.S. sales lost in 1981 to commercial counter-
feiters totaled $16 billion exclusive of subsequent losses in tax revenues); see also Montres
Rolex SA v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
1994]
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aware that it had significant piracy problems. 66 When the penalties were
increased for motion picture and sound recording piracy in 1982, com-
puter software did not enjoy a fully developed mass market.6 7 However, by
the late 1980s, an explosion in personal computer usage made the
software industry a major source of job growth and U.S. exports.6
While the software industry was emerging as the fastest growing sector
of the U.S. economy, software piracy was increasing exponentially. Mass-
marketed software and video games became attractive targets for piracy, in
part, because of their relatively high per-copy retail price and also because
of the ease with which an "exact" copy could be duplicated.
69
As of 1990, the estimated U.S. revenue lost to piracy of mass-marketed
software reached $2.4 billion.70 The displacement of legitimate video
game sales due to piracy was an equally staggering $1.0 billion.7 1 Industry
sources believe that, at a minimum, for each legal or authorized software
program or video game in circulation, an estimated one to three unau-
thorized or illegal copies have been reproduced and distributed.
72
Unfortunately, even when the piracy was large scale, prosecutions
under the Copyright Act were not appealing, because the penalties for
most software piracy remained at the misdemeanor level. Prosecutors
were pressed to pursue software and video game pirates under state73 and
other federal74 laws.
66. See Criminal Sanctions For Violation of Software Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S. 893 Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (statement of Gail Penner on behalf of the Software Publishers
Association).
67. Id.
68. Id. According to statistics maintained by the Software Publishers Association, "the
U.S. software industry currently commands a 75% share of the world-wide software market."
Id Similarly, video games are currently the single largest category of retail toy sales.
69. Id. at 27. Unlike the products produced by other copyright-based industries, mass
marketed software is exceptionally easy to reproduce. "Whereas reproduction of a good copy
of a book requires a printing plant and bindery, and commercial scale reproduction of cop-
ies of video cassettes or audio cassettes requires [reasonably sophisticated equipment,] all that
is required to make perfect copies of a computer program within a few seconds is a standard
personal computer." I&
70. Id. Worldwide, revenue lost by U.S. software publishers due to piracy is even higher,
measuring between $10 and $12 billion annually. The estimated loss in Western Europe
alone is measured at $4.46 billion each year. Id.
71. See Criminal Sanctions For Violation of Sofiware Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S. 893 Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property andJudicial Administration of the House Comm. on theJudiciay,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (statement of James Chame on behalf of the video game
industry).
72. These figures are widely quoted by two software industry trade associations, the
Software Publishers Association and the Business Software Alliance. See also CONG. REc.
S7580 (daily ed. June 4, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
73. See State v. Smith, 789 P.2d 1146 (Wash. 1990) (Copyright Act does not preempt
prosecution under Washington theft statute); State v. Tanner, 534 So. 2d 535 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (defendant convicted on charges of "offense against intellectual property" under Loui-
siana law).
74. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (indictment charging
defendant with violation of National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15, properly dis-
missed because software program is intangible, purely intellectual property, which does not




The software and video game industries became frustrated by this
bootstrap approach to prosecution and, following the example set by the
motion picture and sound recording industries, turned to Congress. Sena-
tors Orrin Hatch (Republican, Utah) and Dennis DeConcini (Democrat,
Arizona) initiated Senate Bill 893, to create felony sanctions for willful
piracy of copyrighted software.
75
As originally drafted, Senate Bill 893 applied only to software. 7 6 Sena-
tor Hatch's bill amended § 2319 of Tide 18, and provided that the repro-
duction or distribution of fifty or more infringing copies of computer
software over a 180-day period would be punishable with up to a five-year
prison term and a $250,000 fine. 77 The reproduction of ten to forty-nine
copies within that same period would be punishable by a fine of up to
$250,000 and/or two years in prison.78 Other violations would be punish-
able by up to a $25,000 fine and/or one year in prison. 79 In floor remarks
Senator Hatch called the bill, "a strong tool for prosecutors who seek to
limit the growing problem of computer software piracy."80 Senate Bill 893
was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April
7, 1992,81 and passed the Senate on June 4, 1992.82 There was no com-
panion House bill.
The Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administra-
tion, House Judiciary Committee, held a hearing on Senate Bill 893 on
August 12, 1992.83 Testimony at the hearing was received from represent-
atives of the computer software and video game industries.
8 4
After this hearing the Subcommittee chairman, Representative Wil-
liam Hughes (Democrat, NewJersey), proposed an amendment in the na-
75. See CONG. REc. S4862 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
76. S. 893, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (enacted after amendment).
77. Id. Specifically, S. 893, as introduced by Senator Hatch provided for.
(1) A fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or
both if, during any 180-day period, at least 50 copies infringing the copyright in one
or more computer programs are reproduced or distributed;
(2) A fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 2 years or
both if, during any 180-day period, more than 10 but less than 50 copies infringing
the copyright in one or more computer programs are reproduced or distributed;





80. S. REP. No. 268, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
81. Id.
82. See CONG. REc. S7581 (daily ed. June 4, 1992) (statement of the presiding officer).
83. See supra note 71.
84. Id Testifying at the Subcommittee hearing on S. 893 were James Charne, general
counsel, Absolute Entertainment, Inc., representing the video game industry, Gail Penner,
counsel, Autodesk, Inc., representing the Software Publishers Association; Edward J. Black,
vice president and general counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association; and
David Ostfeld, chairman, Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers-U.S.A. Mr. Charne
and Ms. Penner endorsed S. 893, while Mr. Black and Mr. Ostfeld expressed concern that
felony provisions might be misapplied to ordinary business disputes and situations involving
reverse engineering.
1994]
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ture of a substitute to Senate Bill 893.85 Rather than adopting a piecemeal
approach to copyright legislation and simply adding computer programs
to audiovisual works, and sound recordings to the list of works whose in-
fringement can give rise to felony penalties under § 2319, Representative
Hughes suggested that felony provisions should apply to willful infringe-
ment of all types of copyright works.8 6 Representative Hughes also sug-
gested altering the "threshold that must be satisfied before felony liability
may be imposed." 87 Representative Hughes' amendment, in the nature of
a substitute, received the endorsement of the proponents of Senate Bill
893, and upon approval by the House of Representatives and Senate, the
proposed substitute became the Copyright Felony Act.88
C. Elements and Nature of the Offense of Criminal Copyright Infringement
Under the Copyright Felony Act
The Copyright Felony Act provides that a felony offense has occurred
where an infringer has reproduced or distributed, within a 180-day period,
at least ten unauthorized copies or phonorecords of one or more copy-
righted works with a collective value of more than $2,500.89 A five-year
prison term and a fine of up to $250,000 can be applied.90 Where the
offense is a second or subsequent offense, the term of imprisonment in-
creases to 10 years.91
In order to secure a conviction under the Copyright Felony Act, the
government is required first to establish that an act of copyright infringe-
85. See Hearing on Criminal Penalties for Copyright Inftingement, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct.
1992).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 997, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN.
3569, 3572.
87. Id.
88. Section 2319, as amended, of Tide 18 of the Copyright Felony Act reads as follows:
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of tide 17 shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall be
in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section-
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set
forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distri-
bution, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1
or more copyrighted works, with a retail value of more than $2,500;
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set
forth in this tide, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense
under paragraph (1); and
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth
in this tide, or both, in any other case.
(c) As used in this section-
(1) the terms "phonorecord" and "copies" have, respectively, the meanings set
forth in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17; and
(2) the terms "reproduction" and "distribution" refer to the exclusive rights of
a copyright owner under clauses (1); and
(3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive rights in copyrighted
works), as limited by sections 107 through 120, of title 17.
18 U.S.C. § 2319.
89. See H.L REP. No. 997, at 3572.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (as amended, 1992).
91. Id. § 2319(b) (2).
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ment has occurred.92 The prosecution's obligation to establish the de-
fendant's guilt by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is a universally
accepted principle of our criminal justice system.93 In a criminal infringe-
ment proceeding the elements to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
are the same as those that must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence in a civil copyright infringement action.9 4 Infringement in a
criminal proceeding is thus determined by reference to basic copyright
law.
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Claim of Criminal Copyright
Infringement
To establish a prima facie claim of either civil or criminal copyright
infringement, two basic elements must be proved: (a) ownership of a valid
copyright in each infringed work; and (b) "copying" by defendants (or
violation of another of the exclusive rights provided to a copyright owner
by the Copyright Act).95 Anyone who "violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner," is an infringer of the copyright. 96
a. Ownership
The first factor, ownership, requires no more proof for a criminal
prosecution than for a civil case. 97 Ownership is most often shown
through certificates of copyright registration for each of the copyright
works involved.98 The Copyright Act specifies that in anyjudicial proceed-
ing a certificate of copyright registration made before or within five years
constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the
facts stated in the certificate. 99
Although not a condition of copyright protection, copyright registra-
tion is a prerequisite for any civil action for infringement involving works
92. See H.R. REP. No. 997 at 3572 ("First, the Government is required to establish that an
act or acts of copyright infringement have occurred.").
93. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. See United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303; United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986).
95. See Larracuente, 952 F.2d at 673; S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 1989).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977) ("[A]ny act which is inconsistent with the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder ... constitutes infringement.").
97. Larracuente, 952 F.2d at 673.
98. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1978)
(certificate of copyright registration is available and gives adequate information of coverage
of copyright); see also Carol Cable Co. v. Grand Auto, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.20 (BNA) 1056, 1061
(N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Plaintiff's copyright registration certificate is prima facie evidence of own-
ership. .. ").
99. Section 410 of Title 17 provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within
five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The eviden-
tiary weight to be accorded the certificate of registration made thereafter shall be
within the discretion of the court.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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of U.S. origin. 10° Copyright registration is also generally accepted as a
prerequisite for criminal copyright proceedings. 10 1 Although the 1976
Copyright Act is silent with respect to a registration requirement in a crim-
inal proceeding, the 1909 Copyright Act made the deposit of copies and
registration a condition precedent to the maintenance of any action for
infringement, including a criminal proceeding.
10 2
However, copyright registration can be challenged even in a criminal
case.' 03 Where a registration certificate is produced, the burden shifts to
the defendant to present evidence of copyright invalidity, 10 4 a license, 1°0
or another defense. Failure to present any evidence to contradict the
prima facie validity of copyright certificates is fatal for the defendant.
10 6
b. Proof of Infringement
It is axiomatic that there can be no civil or criminal infringement
unless there has been a copying of the copyrighted work or violation of
another of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.' 0 7 Copying or violation
of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is proved by showing, first, that
the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and second, that the
defendant reproduced or distributed copies' 0 8 substantially similar' 0 9 to
the copyrighted work.
i. Access
Direct evidence of access to the copyrighted work is often not avail-
able. Access is most frequently established through circumstantial evi-
100. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988), as amended by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (Supp. III 1991).
101. See United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614 (1lth Cir. 1986) (government suffi-
ciently proved what was copyrighted for purposes of action alleging criminal copyright in-
fringement, by introducing copyright registration certificates for allegedly infringed video
games).
102. See United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943).
103. Defects in copyright ownership or lack of originality in the underlying work will
defeat a civil infringement case as well as a criminal infringement case. See Gou.sTnN, supra
note 55, § 11.4.1, at 290-91.
104. See Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.), vacated by, 477 U.S. 991
(1985); United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 711-712 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
106. See United States v, Sherman, 576 F.2d 292, 296 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961,966 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1978);
United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1978).
108. The Copyright Act defines "copies" as:
material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
.copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work
is first fixed.
Id § 101.
109. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977); see
generally 3 MELVILLE B. NiMMER & DAVID NMMER, NIMMER ON CopuRmHT §§ 13.01 [B],13.12
(1993) [hereinafter NIMMER].
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dence. 10 Access can be inferred when there is evidence that the
defendant played a role in the creation'' or manufacture 1 2 of both the
infringed work and the infringing copies. Access can also be presumed
from the fact the copyrighted work at issue is readily available on the mar-
ket, 113 or that the defendant knew the copyrighted work was not readily
available on the market. 114 Moreover, access may be shown indirectly by
evidence the copyrighted work has been widely disseminated. 1 5 Access
may also be inferred when the copies are identical or there are striking
similarities between expressive elements.1 16 In all events, the evidence
must establish that the defendant encountered the work in question.
117
ii. Substantial Similarity
The government must also prove copying by establishing that there is
a substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant's
version or versions. 1 18 A finding of substantial similarity between a copy-
righted work and an alleged infringing work requires more than evidence
of adherence to the general ideas expressed, because ideas in and of
themselves cannot be copyrighted. 1 9 Similarity in expression also is not
infringing to the extent the nature of the creation makes the similarity
necessary. 120 Accordingly, "indispensable expression of generalized
idea [s] maybe protected only against virtually identical copying. " 12 1 If the
110. See United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that circumstantial
evidence including unauthorized copies and recording equipment is adequate to support
conviction for criminal copyright infringement); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984), (holding that conviction for criminal infringe-
ment can be based on circumstantial evidence of illegitimate origin of defendant's motion
picture video tapes, most copied off the air).
111. See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (same photographer photo-
graphed model in essentially the same pose).
112. See, e.g., Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 146 (D.N.J. 1982),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); see also ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722
F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (access may be established by wide dissemination). See generally
NIMMER, supra note 109, § 13.02[A], at 13-21 & n.15 (citing cases); GOLnSTEIN, supra note 55,
§ 7.2.1 & n.13 (citing cases).
114. See United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.), vacated, 477 U.S. 991 (1985).
115. SeeAtari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981). But
see Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co., 649 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ga.
1986), affid, 825 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1987).
116. See Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
See generaly NIMMER, supra note 109, § 13.02[B]), at 13-22.
117. See United States v. Gallo, 599 F. Supp. 241 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that an indict-
ment for conspiracy to infringe copyrights survives motion to dismiss where there is probable
cause to believe that defendants acquired, possessed, and sold copies of infringing video
games).
118. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) states in part: "In no case does copyright protection ... extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery
120. See Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Inv. Secs., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943, 951 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("[W]here an underlying idea may only be conveyed in a more or less stereotyped
manner, duplication of that form of expression does not constitute infringement, even if
there is word for word copying.").
121. See Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affid, 872 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir. 1989).
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copies are not substantially similar in terms of protected expression, there
can be no criminal infringement because, "it is not illegal to possess some-
thing which [only] comes close to copyright infringement."
122
Obviously, a comparison should be made between the alleged infring-
ing copies and the version of the work deposited in the Copyright Of-
fice. 123 It may be enough, however, for the government to provide
evidence that the copyright owner's duplicates are accurate and
authentic.'
24
In some cases, particularly those involving counterfeits of sound re-
cordings, motion pictures, or mass-marketed "off-the-shelf" computer
software, the copies involved will be exact copies of the whole of a copy-
righted work.12 5 Unauthorized literal reproduction of the whole, or sub-
stantially the whole, of a copyrighted work constitutes an infringement.
1 26
Even when only a section or part of the original work has been copied,
substantial similarity can be shown, because literal copying of even one
section will, in most cases, defy coincidence.1 2 7 Common errors can also
be used to prove copying by reducing the statistical probability that the
defendant's work is original.
128
Indirect copying can also be a violation of the copyright owner's ex-
clusive rights. For example, paraphrasing, if done to a great extent, is
copying and an infringement.' 29 A copy made from an infringing copy is
also an infringement of the original.' 3 0 It makes no difference that the
pirate did not know that the version from which he or she was copying was
infringing; the pirate at least knew that he or she did not own what was
being copied.13 ' Even the fact an infringer acknowledges the source from
which the appropriated matter was derived does not relieve him or her of
legal liability.'
3 2
122. United States v. Gallo, 599 F. Supp. 241, 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
123. See United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614-15 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984).
124. Shabazz, 724 F.2d at 1539.
125. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1986).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal. 1974), afl'd, 540
F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977) (holding that infringement for criminal
purposes exists when tapes were made by rerecording copyrighted tapes and copying more
than trivial parts even though slight changes were made).
127. See Ace Novelty Co. v. Superior Toy & Novelty Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 240
(N.D. I1. 1983); see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that no
copier may defend an act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copyrighted work
he has not pirated).
128. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
common errors, omissions and inconsistencies in baseball card guide support finding of
infringement).
129. SeeAnsehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 138 (8th Cir.), cel. denied, 287
U.S. 666 (1932).
130. See Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
131. American Press Ass'n y. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed,
193 U.S. 675 (1904).
132. See Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959
(1979) (holding that compliance with notice and royalty provision of compulsory license




2. Effect of First Sale Doctrine on Criminal Copyright
Infringement Proceeding
Because felony sanctions are available for both unauthorized repro-
duction and unauthorized distribution of copies of a copyrighted work,
13 3
the first sale doctrine must be considered in a criminal copyright infringe-
ment proceeding involving unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted
work.
Unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted work is an infringement.
The Copyright Act provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right
"to distribute copies... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending," 13 4 and
"[a] nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
... is an infringer of the copyright." 13 5 The legislative history of the Copy-
right Act makes it clear that "any unauthorized public distribution of cop-
ies.., that were unlawfully made would be an infringement."
3 6
The copyright owner's distribution right is akin to an exclusive right
to control the first publication or first public distribution of copies or pho-
norecords of the work.' 3 7 This concept, known as the "first sale" doctrine,
gives the copyright owner the right to sell or publicly distribute particular
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work. The distribution right
ceases once the owner has parted with those particular copies or pho-
norecords. a3 8 The Copyright Act states that the owner of a particular, law-
fully made copy or phonorecord is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy
or phonorecord. 139
The first sale doctrine applies only where the possibility exists that the
person possessing the copyrighted work obtained it lawfully. 140 In other
words, if you own a lawfully made copy, you have the right to sell or lease
that copy to another party. The only exceptions are sound recordings and
software, which may not be rented without the authorization of the copy-
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
136. H.R REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5676. Section 109 of the Copyright Act limits the exclusive right of a copyright owner
to distribute copies. Section 109(a) provides: "the owner of a particular copy .. .lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy...."
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added). This section, which embodies
the first sale doctrine, does not apply to the case of piratical software vendors. The primary
reason is that the piratical copy is not "lawfully made under this title." Indeed, the Notes of
the Committee on the Judiciary explicitly state that "any resale of an illegally 'pirated' pho-
norecord would be an infringement...." H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 79, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5693.
137. See Annotation, G. M. Buechlein, Burden and Sufficiency of Proof Under First Sak Doc-
trine in Prosecution for Copyright Infringement 94 A.LR. FED. 101 (1989).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (c) (Supp. III 1991).
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 73 (8th Cir. 1983).
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right owner. 141 There can be no lawful distribution of pirated or counter-
feit copies of a work, because the copyright holder cannot, by definition,
part with legal title through a first sale.
142
The first sale doctrine is significant in prosecutions for copyright in-
fringement, because the government must show proof that particular
items are copies of a work that infringe a copyright and not merely legiti-
mate products of resale.1 43 The first sale doctrine is also a defense in
criminal copyright infringement cases. 144 When a defendant presents evi-
dence that the copies in question were legally made and that he or she
owned them, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the
copies were either not legally made or not owned by the defendant. 145
The government may show that the defendant knew that a particular copy
of the copyrighted work had not been sold first by the copyright owner
through direct evidence 146 or as an inference from circumstantial
evidence.'
47
The indictment does not necessarily have to allege specifically that
the defendant knew that a first sale of the copyrighted material had not
been made or disprove every conceivable scenario in which the defendant
would be innocent of infringement. 148 The indictment, however, should
fairly inform the defendant of the offense charged: criminal copyright
infringement.
149
141. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a) (Supp. III
1991) ("[N] either the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a
particular copy of a computer program ... may, for the purposes of direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that pho-
norecord or computer program... by rental, lease or lending. .. ."); see also A&M Records,
Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendants who were shown
to have rented records were liable for infringement).
142. Powe//, 701 F.2d at 73.
143. See United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that govern-
ment has the burden of establishing that defendant's activities are forbidden by the criminal
copyright statute); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
929 (1977) (holding that government must prove the absence of a first sale).
144. See United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1977) (conviction reversed
because government failed to prove that copies sold by defendant had not been subject to
first sale).
145. United States v. Goss, 803 F.2d 638, 644 (11th Cir. 1986).
146. United States v. Drum, 733 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cooper
v. United States, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
147. See United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 991
(1985) (holding that on evidence in record, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew that records charged in the indictment were not the subject
of a valid first sale).
148. United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that govern-
ment's burden is to show that defendant did not distribute a lawfully obtained copy, but
government need not disprove every conceivable scenario in which defendant would be in-
nocent of infringement).
149. United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 72-73 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that an indict-
ment for criminal infringement is not defective even though government failed to allege that
defendants knew that first sale rights did not apply-, "[a]n indictment is generally sufficient if
it sets forth the words of the statute itself, as long as those words fairly inform the defendant
of the elements necessary to constitute the offense charged"); see United States v. Steerwell
Leisure Corp., 598 F. Supp. 171, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Schmidt, 15 F. Supp.
804 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (holding that an indictment charging defendant with inciting, counsel-




Intent to infringe must also be established. In accordance with the
language of the Copyright Act, the government must prove that the de-
fendant infringed "willfully and for purpose of commercial advantage or
private financial gain."
150
With regard to civil copyright infringement, proof of willful intent to
infringe may result in an increased damage award.' 5 1 Such proof is not
required to prevail on the underlying claim of infringement, because
copyright is a strict liability tort.152 For a conviction on charges of crimi-
nal copyright infringement, the government must prove a specific crimi-
nal intent to infringe.1 53 Without the requisite criminal intent or mens rea,
no criminal violation has occurred, even if the number of unauthorized
copies or phonorecords reproduced or distributed is significant.'
54
Although both the Copyright Act and the Copyright Felony Act use
the term "willfully" in describing criminal copyright infringement, the
term has never been defined by statute. The legislative history of the
Copyright Felony Act shows that Congress intended for the courts to as-
sume the task of defining this term.
1 55
Not every criminal statute requires evidence of specific intent to vio-
late the law. Indeed, criminal law presumes generally that every person
knows the law, and that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no
defense to criminal prosecution.' 56 A requirement of specific intent to
violate the law is most often reserved for relatively intricate areas of law,
such as criminal tax evasion.
1 57
The government does not have to show that a defendant has detailed
knowledge of the statute prohibiting the conduct in question to prove that
the defendant exhibited specific intent to violate the law.158 If the govern-
ment did have to make such a showing, defense lawyers could argue that
their clients should be acquitted simply because they were unfamiliar with
the intricacies of a substantive area of law such as copyright.
The better view is that specific intent to violate the law is established
by proof that the defendant intended to act as he did and that the defend-
ant's actions were knowing or voluntary, not accidental. This approach is
Blanton, 531 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (affirming con-
viction even though statute was erroneously cited in indictment; record shows defendant was
not misled or prejudiced by error).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).
151. See id. § 504(c)(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its dis-
cretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000.").
152. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).
153. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 4-5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3573.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609 (1991).
157. Id. at 609 ("[The] special treatment of criminal tax offenses [as specific intent crimes]
is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws.").
158. Id.
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consistent with well settled case authority regarding the meaning of willful-
ness in a wide variety of contexts. 15 9
In the context of criminal copyright infringement, courts have inter-
preted the term "willfully" in two ways. The majority of courts have said
that the language of the Copyright Act makes criminal copyright infringe-
ment a "specific" intent crime; in other words, a prosecutor must show
that the accused specifically intended to violate the copyright law.
160
The minority view, endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, holds
that in the context of a criminal copyright infringement proceeding, "will-
ful" means only intent to copy, not intent to infringe. 161 For example, the
Second Circuit found liability where the defendant, although without ac-
tual notice from the copyright owner, unlawfully issued instructions to
make copies resembling the copyrighted work "as closely as they might
without 'copyright trouble,'" indicating the defendant was aware of the
legal prohibition against infringement.
162
The minority view, which requires only evidence of an intent to copy,
places a significantly lower burden on prosecutors. It is not surprising that
most criminal copyright infringement cases are initiated in the circuits
that have adopted this minority view.
Irrespective of the definition applied, a finding of willful infringe-
ment in a criminal copyright infringement proceeding can be based on
direct 6 3 or circumstantial' 64 evidence. Willfulness is a factual determina-
159. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (holding that defendant did
not have to know that statements were being made to the United States government to be
convicted under the False Statements Act); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394
(1933) (holding that the word "willfully" is "employed to characterize a thing done without
ground for believing it is lawful... or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not
one has the right so to act") (citations omitted); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1564
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992) (holding that a defendant was not required to
know that the structuring of a currency transaction was unlawful to be convicted under Bank
Secrecy Act); United States v.Jones, 735 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984)
(holding that willful violation of mining regulations was intentional, knowing or voluntary, as
distinguished from accidental, and did not require knowledge of the terms of the safety stan-
dard); United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that crime of criminal
contempt does not require that defendant intend to violate statute making such an act a
crime); United States v. Keegan, 331 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1964)
(holding that willfulness on bribery charges was sufficiently established by proof of knowing
and intentional commission of the acts charged); United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.
1957) (holding that a willful wiretap violation was sufficiently established by proof that de-
fendant intended to act as he did, rather than proof of intent to violate Federal Communica-
tions Act); Cheek v. United States, 111 S. CL 604, 610 (1991) (holding in a criminal tax
prosecution that a good faith misunderstanding of the law or the good faith belief that one's
actions were not illegal negates a charge of willfulness).
160. See United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant
must have engaged in the infringing conduct with knowledge that his -or her activity was
prohibited by law). But see United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049-51 (D. Neb.
1991) (discussing the willfulness criterion at some length and holding that a person who
made and rented unauthorized copies of videotapes did not "willfully" infringe, even though
he was aware that original videotapes were protected under Copyright Act).
161. See United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1040 (1977).
162. United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d at 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943).
163. See Dean v. Burrows, 732 F. Supp. 816, 825-26 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (infringer fraudu-
lently obtained authorized copy of work, removed copyright notice, then copied and sold
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tion that will not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is
clearly erroneous. 165
The mens rea for criminal copyright infringement also requires evi-
dence that the defendant acted "for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain."166 Although actual sale of a counterfeit or pirated
copy is the best evidence that the defendant has a commercial purpose or
financial objective, a "for-profit" objective can be established by an act as
simple as giving an infringing copy to a government witness to test before
buying. 167 The government is not required to show that the defendant
actually realized a profit from the infringement, and lack of profitability is
not grounds for arresting a criminal infringement judgment. 168 The gov-
ernment has to show only that the defendant hoped to make a profit 169 or
realize a commercial gain.
170
Both owners17 1 and employees 172 can be found to have infringed for
the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Indeed,
the fact the defendant is an employee and not an owner will not preclude
liability.173
Of course, the Copyright Felony Act cannot be applied to every in-
fringement, even if there is evidence the defendant intended to ignore
copyright law or acted for the purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain. The legislative history of the Copyright Felony Act clearly
states that "ordinary business disputes such as those involving reverse engi-
neering of computer programs or contract disputes over the scope of
licenses" will not give rise to felony liability.
174
work; liability for willful infringement found); see also RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp.
849, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that for purposes of showing willfulness in civil action,
defendant's earlier guilty plea to two counts of criminal copyright infringement meant he
knew similar conduct was unlawful).
164. See United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 334 (1992) (holding that evidence presented was sufficient to support element of
knowledge or intent to join conspiracy to infringe where defendant had control over tapes,
had key to storage unit where tapes were kept, had shown others how to use tape duplicating
machine, and had transported tapes from production site to storage unit); see also United
States v. Gottesmann, 724 F.2d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence presented
was sufficient to show that defendant willfully infringed on copyright where she was present
at meetings in which her husband told undercover FBI agents that videotape source was
secret and where she provided lists of available movies to agents and claimed that she was a
partner in the operation).
165. Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir. 1991).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).
167. United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979).
168. United States v. Stolon, 555 F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("If...
the Government has demonstrated... the profit motive of the defendant, then the Govern-
ment has met its burden .... ').
170. United States v. Steele, 785 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. See Luft v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1378, 1379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
172. U.S. v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987).
173. Id.
174. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 5 ("In cases where civil liability is unclear-
whether because the law is unsettled, or because a legitimate business dispute exists-the
Committee does not intend to establish criminal liability."); see also United States v. Lar-
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4. Threshold of Infringement
To secure a conviction under the Copyright Felony Act, the govern-
ment must first establish the infringement and then show that at least ten-
copies or phonorecords, with a retail value of more than $2500, have been
copied or distributed without the copyright owner's permission within a
180-day period.175 These ten copies or phonorecords can represent an
infringement of one copyrighted work or an aggregation of different
works of authorship.1 76 The Copyright Felony Act does not require that
all the copyrights affected be in the same class or be held by the same
copyright owner. This means that a case for felony conviction can be built
by showing that several copyright holders have been adversely affected by
one infringer. For example, a defendant's reproduction of five copies of a
copyrighted word-processing computer program having a retail value of
$300 and the reproduction of five copies of a copyrighted spreadsheet
computer program also having a retail value of $300 would satisfy the re-
quirement of reproducing 10 copies having a retail value of at least $2,500,
if done within a 180-day period.1 77 If less than ten copies have been cop-
ied or distributed, or if the copies have a combined value of less than
$2,500, the offense is a misdemeanor.
178
Again, the government must also show evidence that the infringing
copies have a retail value of more than $2,500 to secure a felony convic-
tion.' 7 9 "Retail value" was deliberately undefined, but the implication is
that it will, in most cases, represent the price at which the work that is
being infringed is sold through normal retail channels.180 Where a
"usual" retail value cannot be established, the courts may look to the sug-
gested retail price, the wholesale price, the replacement cost of the item,
or financial injury caused to the copyright owner. It may even be appro-
priate in some cases to use saved acquisition costs to place a value on the
infringing copies.
181
racuente, 952 F.2d 672, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1992) ("If the accused infringer has been licensed by
a licensee of the copyright owner, that is a matter of affirmative defense.").
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1).
176. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 6 ("The phrase 'of one or more copyrighted
works' is intended to permit aggregation of different works of authorship to meet the re-
quired number of copies and retail value.").
177. Id.
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also United States v. Cross,
816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3).
180. See United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
the trial court was correct in applying the "normal retail price, rather than the lower bootleg
price paid by those who presumably are aware that the prices they are buying are not legiti-
mate," but noting possible exceptions); United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1119 (9th
Cir. 1991) (court established probable loss based on market value); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B5.3,
cmt., reprinted in, 18 U.S.C.A. app. (Supp. 1994) (sentencing guidelines for copyright in-
fringement designed to adequately reflect the anticipated gains to the criminals or losses to
the victims of the crime). But see United States v. Kim, 963 F.2d 65, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "retail value" is based on the value of the counterfeit merchandise, but that
using retail value of genuine merchandise was also relevant to calculation of "retail value").
181. See, e.g., Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1985);
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.D.C. 1981).
NVot. 71:3
CRIMJNAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A successful felony prosecution will also require proof that the statu-
tory requirements, both in terms of number of copies and retail value have
been met within a 180-day period. This requirement exists to preclude
from felony prosecution, "children making copies for friends," as well as
"other incidental copying of copyrighted works having a relatively low re-
tail value."182 The 180-day period is also intended to remove the "possibil-
ity that the increased penalties under the bill for computer program
infringement can be used as a tool of harassment in business disputes over
reverse engineering."1"'
CONCLUSION
The Copyright Felony Act represents a significant improvement in the
criminal sanctions that can be imposed against willful copyright infringe-
ment. While tangible evidence of the deterrent effect of these increased
sanctions will not exist for some time, copyright owners can be expected to
press increasingly for criminal prosecution of large-scale pirates.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 6.
183. Id. This language was included presumably to alleviate concerns expressed by cer-
tain computer industry representatives that increased criminal penalties might be used by
certain software vendors as a weapon against competitors in infringement cases where civil
liability is unclear-whether because the law is unsettled, or because a legitimate business
dispute exists. See Criminal Sanctions For Volation of Software Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S.893
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-70 (1991) (statement of EdwardJ. Black, Vice President and
General Counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association, and Statement of
David Ostfeld, Chairman, Intellectual Property Committee, Institute of Electrical & Electron-
ics Engineers-United States Activities).
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